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Abstract 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is a rapidly growing industry, both in terms of the increase in 
export terminals, as well as the growing number of regasification plants required to put natural gas 
back into pipelines. In the selection of a location or design of new facilities, the potential impact 
of an accidental release must be evaluated. Some of the protective and mitigative measures 
required by onshore storage and handling facilities for reducing impacts due to accidental releases 
are dictated by 49 CFR 193, with design requirements based on accidental leakage calculations 
following NFPA 59A. In the United States, these measures are reviewed by the US Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). Siting and construction of onshore and 
nearshore LNG facilities are authorized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 
While various specific regulations and codes require some measures, a detailed evaluation of the 
potential consequences may indicate that additional mitigative actions are needed. 
PHMSA requires both pool fire and dispersion models from scenarios of accidental releases 
of accumulated LNG in containment basins as per the 49 CFR 193 regulation in order to meet the 
NFPA 59A standards. Containment basins include LNG tank impoundments, trenches, and sumps, 
which are often modeled with LNG accumulating due to a guillotine break of the largest pipe.  
While accidental releases of LNG can be mitigated by trenches, sumps, and other forms of 
impoundment, the effectiveness of the mitigation is impacted by the nature of the trenches and 
containment basins. Any positive or negative impact is difficult to predict without complex 
evaluation. For example, if the tank itself is designed in such a way that a rip or rupture of the 
inner tank wall followed by thermal cracking of the external wall is a credible scenario, the 
elevation of a resulting hole as well as the size of it could render the basin walls inadequate 
depending on the location and extent of tank damage and impoundment geometry. Also, in terms 
of trenching used to direct LNG to containment basins, the geometry of the trench itself combined 
with the wind direction can have a significant impact on the generated plume size with LNG 
accumulation. In particular, a long linear span of trenching that is parallel with the wind direction 
may result in enough accumulation to generate a large plume well in excess of 1 kilometer. 
CFD models predict that the magnitude and location of an LNG release, the weather 
conditions, the regional terrain, release impingement, and the duration of the release can all greatly 
influence how far a combustible gas cloud will travel. Proximity of pipelines to vehicular or 
railway traffic can lead to an increased frequency of pipe breaks, and sometimes older facilities 
may be lacking in protective measures such as vapor fences that could better protect the public. 
Potential causes of releases will be explored and a range of possible improvements with prevention 
and mitigation measures will be discussed.  
Introduction 
Changes in the market due to enhanced recovery methods have led to cheap abundant 
natural gas (NG) in countries such as the United States. This has led investors to build LNG 
export terminals, and by 2020 the United States is forecasted to account for 15% of global 
liquefaction capacity, becoming the third largest exporter in the world (1). All onshore LNG 
storage and handling facilities in the United States are regulated by the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), and a 
lot of focus has been placed on ensuring the safety of the public in the transportation of LNG and 
operation of LNG facilities. 
Some of the first imports of LNG occurred in the 1960’s in Europe, and four marine 
terminals were built in the United States from 1971-1980 (2). During the years when LNG 
import terminals were built in the United States and Europe, there was a growing interest in 
better understanding the behavior of LNG released into the environment, after which several 
computer models were developed in the 1970’s and several LNG spill experiments were done in 
the 1980’s. Today, DEGADIS (Dense Gas Dispersion Model), PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis 
Software Tool), and GexCon’s FLACS (Flame Acceleration Simulator) are the primary 
modeling tools used in the evaluation of consequences related to accidental releases of LNG.  
This paper will discuss the evolution of LNG dispersion research, as well as an evaluation of 
the applicability, strengths, and weaknesses of some of the more commonly used tools. 
Additionally, further details will be provided on flashing and jetting releases of LNG. 
After providing an overview of the models, two case studies will be presented, one for a 
PHMSA facility siting project that explores arrangements of sumps and trenches, and another for 
an existing LNG facility in a location with complex terrain. Both facilities were studied with 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models, with the first case study using FLACS and the 
second one using Star-CCM+ (computational continuum mechanics) by CD-adapco 
(Computational Dynamics-Analysis & Design Application Company). Further detail will be 
provided on the methodology and rationale used for the Star-CCM+ model for the second case 
study. 
Finally, an overview of several preventative and mitigative measures will be presented that 
can help with efforts related to reducing or eliminating consequences related to accidental 
releases of LNG.  
History of LNG Dispersion Research 
In the 1970’s there were a number of models regarding LNG vapor cloud dispersion, but 
with great variations in results. In a study by Dr. J. A. Havens in 1977, seven of these models 
were evaluated and predicted dispersion distances anywhere between 1.2 - 81 km (0.75 - 50 
miles) for the same catastrophic 25,000 m3 (6.6 million gallon) LNG spill (3). Due to the wide 
variation in modeling results, experimental testing was desired to better understand the behavior 
of cryogenic liquid spills and resulting vapor cloud dispersion.  Maplin Sands, Burro, and Coyote 
LNG spill experiments were performed in 1980 and 1981 leading to the development of the 
earliest models including the SLAB and FEM3 computer codes (4). The Dense Gas Dispersion 
model DEGADIS was later developed for Gas Research Institute (GRI) in 1985 for ground level 
dispersion, and went through several iterations throughout the years improving the predictions of 
the model. Additional testing was later done with the Falcon LNG spill experiments in 1987.  
 
Figure 1: 1987 Falcon LNG spill experiment (5) 
As a result of the full scale experiment, several unique physical phenomena are observed 
with LNG vapors such as reductions in turbulent mixing with air, density stratification, and 
gravity flow of the cloud (4). As the cloud is heated, the turbulent mixing activity increases until 
the vaporized NG eventually disperses into the surrounding air. However, as long as the cloud 
remains cool, the NG dispersion will be limited. The driving force for dispersion of an LNG 
vapor cloud is predominantly the wind, any obstacles the cloud may encounter, as well as the 
terrain. The layered nature of the atmosphere and the large amount of force applied to it by the 
atmosphere also tends to stratify or “pancake” horizontal releases of material. All of these factors 
combined lead to vertical dispersion being very low while horizontal dispersion is very high with 
releases of cryogenic materials. 
As computing power has advanced over the years along with our scientific understanding, 
the sophistication of our modeling capabilities has improved to the point of modeling the 
underlying physics in 3-dimensional geometries through CFD modeling. Today, CFD modeling 
is commonly used for LNG spill dispersion modeling. GexCon’s FLACS is perhaps one of the 
most well-known CFD models for LNG spill dispersion modeling and has had extensive 
validation, being the only CFD software with official approval by the US Department of 
Transportation (DOT), PHMSA for LNG vapor gas dispersion modeling as of 2016 (6).  Other 
consequence modeling software, such as DNV-GL’s PHAST, has also been approved by 
PHMSA for LNG vapor gas dispersion modeling (7). Other CFD modeling tools are actively 
going through the PHMSA approval process, such as CD-adapco’s Star-CCM+ (5).  
Evaluation of Available Models 
The models used for LNG releases can be divided into two types: empirical, which try to 
match experimental observations with characterizing equations and often rely on Gaussian plume 
correlations for gas dispersion, and CFD models, which attempt to simulate the underlying 
physics in a discretized 3D computational domain. 49 CFR 193.2059 explicitly approves 
DEGADIS and FEM3A. Other models approved by PHMSA are the empirical model PHAST 
and the CFD model FLACS. DEGADIS allows the modeler to define the LNG vapor source 
term, such as a predefined LNG containment sump with the vapor generation rate defined by the 
user. PHAST can directly simulate a release from a pressurized vessel through a pipe break or 
leak, an orifice release over a set period of time, or through a user defined source term such as a 
vaporizing pool. In comparison to the mentioned empirical models, FLACS is more sophisticated 
and in a sense more exact by simulating the actual LNG spill in real time as it grows and boils 
off due to heat transfer from the ground and also the sun, not requiring a separate source term for 
vapor generation. This allows the model to be applicable to trenches and other complex 
geometric features which are more challenging to model or sometimes not possible with 
depending on the empirical model. Additionally, FLACS has a FLASH utility that allows the 
user to separately calculate a resulting vapor release from a liquid jet release flashing into a gas 
at high pressures and velocities. 
Formal interpretations by PHMSA place additional requirements on LNG vapor dispersion 
modeling that restrict the types of models that may be used under different circumstances. 
Empirical models are restricted to flat terrain, and with the exception of PHAST allowing a 
single structure’s wake influence, obstructions in the dispersion pathway are not incorporated 
into these models. PHMSA has stated that DEGADIS can no longer use the SOURCE5 source 
term model to calculate vapor gas dispersion zones for LNG facilities, and further states that 
DEGADIS does not account for jetting and flashing releases from pressurized piping and 
equipment (8). It has been found that jet release scenarios are typically the bounding case for 
facility siting studies, and in order to model a jet release, methods other than DEGADIS must be 
used, which commonly leads to PHAST being an initial screening tool and FLACS being a more 
detailed tool to evaluate mitigations such as vapor fences, trenches, and troughs (9).  
PHMSA has specified a list of experimental results that models must be compared to 
become approved for LNG vapor dispersion modeling, known as the Model Evaluation Protocol 
(MEP). Currently, the only LNG tests specified in the MEP database are the Maplin, Burro, 
Coyote, and Falcon tests in the 1980’s (10). A brief summary of the scale of these LNG tests is 
illustrated in the table below. 








Maplin 1980 1-instant 5-31 
Burro 1980 12-18 24-39 
Coyote 1981 6-19 3-28 
Falcon 1987 9-30 20-66 
Based on these parameters, the total duration of the releases except for the Maplin tests 
(which consisted of direct spills into the sea) is estimated between 0.5 - 2.2 minutes.  In addition, 
these are relatively small volumetric releases of LNG; by comparison, a tanker truck can hold 40 
m3 of LNG whereas a marine tanker may hold 25,000 m3 of LNG (11). As such, there is 
currently no officially listed experimental data for jetting and flashing releases of large quantities 
of LNG from high pressure sources, catastrophic failures of large LNG storage tanks, or long 
time duration releases of LNG (such as the 10-minute duration specified by NFPA 59A (12)). 
LNG spill tests of 300 m3 and 3,000 m3 have already been suggested to address variations found 
in model predictions at increased volumes (11). Regarding jets, it is well documented that a large 
fraction of the liquids present in flashing LNG jets can vaporize before raining out into a pool, as 
shown in testing undertaken by Shell in 1974 and Advantica in 2007 (13). The lack of 
experimental data on flashing jet releases is especially problematic because all of the 
aforementioned tests dealt with LNG spills into pools of water. In fact, even leaks from the base 
of a large LNG tank can result in a jet release (13). If the jet release is mechanically fragmented, 
as is typically the case with pressurized or highly turbulent LNG releases, heat transfer with the 
air due to mixing of spray may be sufficient to vaporize the entire jet even before it hits the 
ground (13). In order to better validate models that deal with large jet releases over a long time 
duration, there would be great value in further experimental testing of LNG releases covering 
large volumetric release rates and large flashing jet releases and adding these to the MEP 
database.  
While both PHAST and FLACS are able to model flashing jet releases, PHMSA has noted 
certain limitations to be mindful of when choosing these models. For PHAST, these limitations 
are regarding dispersion from high aspect ratio sources such as trenches (though this can be 
accomplished with some non-default parameters), crosswind releases, dispersion over varying or 
sloped terrain, and dispersion with obstacles causing wind channeling (7). FLACS is more robust 
in that it can handle obstacles and channeling effects, but its main limitation is inaccuracies with 
dispersion over terrain with at least a 10% grade due to the stair-stepping method of 
representation of the Cartesian grid (6). 
In summary, as long as the terrain throughout the LNG facility and surrounding area has no 
greater than a 10% grade, FLACS is well suited for LNG facility siting requirements. For flat 
terrain with minimal obstacles other software packages – with great care in defining non-default 
parameters – such as PHAST may be used. Fortunately, most LNG facilities being constructed in 
the United States are LNG export and import terminals located on rivers and coastlines where 
marine tankers can be filled with LNG or offload LNG and the terrain is relatively flat. However, 
there are LNG facilities that have been constructed in hilly or mountainous regions, and under 
these conditions, there is currently no officially approved model for dispersion in these areas. As 
such, persons doing LNG dispersion models in these regions are using unapproved general 
purpose CFD modeling software packages capable of incorporating complex angled terrain, until 
FLACS is upgraded to allow for proper handling of sloped terrain. 
1st Case Study –Greenfield LNG Facility with River Levee and Trenching 
The first case study involved a greenfield LNG facility along a river at a preliminary front 
end engineering design (FEED) stage. The facility was on flat terrain with the exception of a 
levee found along the river for flood control.  
 
Figure 2: Greenfield LNG facility – Initial FEED concept 
Spills from the LNG tanks are designed to be held by the containment dike. In addition, 
LNG is pumped from the tanks to the marine offloading arms via large diameter overhead LNG 
piping. Additional containment is found throughout the facility for truck transportation or other 
facility equipment leaks. Trenches and sumps underneath large diameter loading/unloading 
piping are designed to contain leaked material allowing for safe evaporation and dispersion out 
of the containment system. 
Preliminary modelling of the facility was done using PHAST, followed by more detailed 
modeling of LNG pooling and vaporization out of the containment dike, sump, and trenches 
found throughout the facility using FLACS. While using FLACS for LNG spill vaporization 
dispersion modeling due to leaks from the large diameter LNG piping, one interesting 
observations was that if the wind direction was parallel to the trench that contained LNG, the 
dispersion distance of the ½ lower flammability limit (LFL) contours out of the long trench 
would be substantially further compared to the same ½ LFL dispersion contours from vaporizing 
LNG in the sump or containment dike alone under otherwise similar conditions. The levee itself 
was roughly 13 feet tall and had a maximum grade of 30°. Containment dikes also had a 
relatively steep grade. During modeling it was discovered that the orientation of the trench being 
parallel with the additional containment diking found above the LNG storage tank containment 
dike and the levee combined to create a strong channeling effect, even though the distance from 
the trench to the levee was approximately 100 meters. This channeling effect combined with the 
trench caused the LNG to become more concentrated due to it restricting expansion in lateral 
directions. This restriction to expansion resulted in much higher concentrations further 
downwind compared to those seen with other wind directions or different spill locations. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of relative travel distances of FLACS LNG vapor dispersion contours from containment basins 
2nd Case Study – Worst Case Scenario Modeling for an LNG Facility with Hilly Terrain 
The second case study considers an existing LNG facility with hilly terrain and large 
variations in elevation. The goal was a series of worst case scenario (WCS) models of the 
facility. While the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires WCS models for facility 
risk management plans (RMPs) under their jurisdiction as part of the Clean Air Act Section 
112(r), LNG facilities fall under the jurisdiction of DOT and do not require a WCS model for 
siting evaluation. In fact, PHMSA’s siting requirements are that all failure scenarios with a 
minimum failure frequency of 3 x 10-5 occurrences per year be evaluated. This frequency 
corresponds to the rupture frequency of the largest diameter LNG withdrawal line connected to 
an LNG storage tank (14). Going back to the desire to generate WCS models for this facility, 
they were not based on any regulatory driver, but instead were used for emergency response 
planning (ERP) purposes. 
Model Setup 
The LNG storage area is located close to the top of a large hill, with many parts of the 
surrounding area having over a 10% grade. These characteristics meant that the terrain would 
play a large role in how LNG vapors would disperse throughout the region. The complexity of 
the terrain and the large slopes meant that FLACS would fall outside of PHMSA’s criteria for 
using the software for an LNG facility. Although no other software is approved by PHMSA for 
such circumstances, these WCS models are not a requirement by PHMSA in either case so the 
usage of another software was not an issue. As such, it was decided that Star-CCM+ by CD-
adapco would be used to conduct CFD modeling for this facility since it can import and use 
complex terrain. It should be noted that this decision does not constitute an endorsement of this 
product but is strictly shown to highlight the findings and provide a methodology that can be 
followed for facilities under similar circumstances. The topography of the region is illustrated 
below. 
 
Figure 4: LNG containment location (blue arrow) and surrounding topography 
The terrain was generated from a digital elevation model (DEM) downloaded from the 
United States Geological Service (USGS) National Elevation Dataset (NED) in a grid float 
format. This data has a resolution of 1/3 arc-second, which corresponds to an elevation data point 
roughly every 10 meters. One of the challenges that is often experienced with atmospheric 
dispersion models over complex terrain is the issue of turbulence eddy clipping, which occurs 
when jagged terrain is found along an inlet or outlet plane of the model. When a geometric 
feature creates a recirculation zone that reaches the edge of the computational domain, it can lead 
to instabilities in the model or even solution divergence and a crash. To resolve this issue, an 
additional smoothed border was added around the terrain shown in Figure 4. This smoothed 
border is illustrated in Figure 5 below. 
 
Figure 5: Border smoothing technique applied around topography 
Another challenge for the model was the nature of the LNG release itself. Most LNG 
vaporization models involve the filling of a containment basin with LNG and subsequent 
vaporization as heat is transferred, mostly from ground conduction, wind convection, and solar 
radiation, and are relatively straightforward in that a separate vapor generating source term can 
be defined as the input into the model. As mentioned earlier, LNG releases that are jetting and 
flashing can easily pose the greatest consequences, so these were the focus of the chosen WCS 
models. This can be evidently seen by simulating a high pressure horizontal release of a flashing 
liquid in PHAST, where consequence distances can easily extend over a mile depending on the 
nature of the release, as illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Horizontal release of high pressure LNG in PHAST 
These sorts of releases are much more complicated to simulate in CFD, and the simpler 
technique of a fixed vaporizing pool with a spill cannot be done. Without having access to the 
FLACS FLASH utility, this jetting and flashing mechanism was instead directly simulated in the 
Star-CCM+ CFD software.  
Two different wind speeds were used, the standard speed of 2 m/s and the lowest wind speed 
of 0.46 m/s excluding the 10th percentile both at class F stability and a relative humidity of 50% 
in accordance with NFPA 59A (12). Additionally, the average annual temperature of 50°F and 
barometric pressure of 101720 kPa was used. 
The wind in the simulation was first converged under steady state conditions, then the 
simulation was changed to unsteady state to better capture varying turbulence eddies and 
converged. The LNG release was then introduced into the model under unsteady conditions. The 
release was slowly introduced at very low flow rates at short time steps, then steadily increased 
until reaching its maximum release rate to maintain stability during the simulation.  
Failure Scenario 1 – Worst Case Pipeline Guillotine 
The first scenario involved a worst case pipeline guillotine in the facility. The hypothetical 
mechanism was a vehicular collision causing a complete shearing of the pipe resulting in a 
release of LNG. Since this was a worst case analysis, the piping with the highest pressure in the 
facility was used, which was 800 psig. Not much information was known about the location of 
the piping, so it was assumed to be found close to a road. ASPEN HYSYS was used to calculate 
the flow rate out of an 8” schedule 120 pipe at the given pressure and came up with 509 kg/s, or 
1.2 m3/s. The pipe release was assumed to have a TI (turbulence intensity) of 5% (medium-high 
turbulence) and a TLS (turbulent length scale) of 0.0128 m. 
From the simulation, the very high pressures resulted in a mechanically fragmented jet that 
quickly absorbed heat from the ambient air and flashed into NG, which appeared correct based 
on the literature cited in Evaluation of Available Models. Pink vertical slice planes of these 
releases at the two wind speeds are shown in Figure 7 below. 
 
Figure 7: Flashing LNG jet release with 0.46 m/s wind shown on the left and 2 m/s wind shown on the right 
Greater wind speeds increase the volatilization rate due to increased convection, as would be 
expected. The change into NG vapor from this release can be seen in the next picture. 
 
Figure 8: NG vapors formed from flashing release with 2 m/s wind (red = LFL) 
One interesting observation from the images shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 is that because 
the ground is slightly sloping upwards while the pipe release eventually impinges on it, the LNG 
plume is even closer along the ground starting out. Different wind directions were run, and in 
each simulation the plume tended to follow wherever the wind took it. The wind travel itself was 
also strongly influenced by the terrain. One example is shown in the following simulation that 
had a wind from north-northwest at 2 m/s. 
 
Figure 9: NG vapors from high pressure flashing release, 2 m/s wind from north-northwest (red = LFL) 
In this example, the furthest extent of the plume is 6 km to the southeast corner of the 
domain. Note the PHAST example shown in Figure 6 had the LFL contours only rising up 11.5 
meters, and extending 880 meters downwind. PHAST also predicts much greater horizontal 
dispersion in proportion to the plume length in the absence of terrain obstacles, with a total width 
of 580 meters. In the case of the CFD model, there is a great deal of channeling from the terrain, 
especially given the fact that cryogenic gases tend to pancake and stay low to the ground. This 
case had one hill to the south and another to the east (see Figure 4) essentially choke the LNG 
plume and channel it out to the southeast corner of the domain, illustrating the critical 
importance of factoring in topography in this particular model. 
Failure Scenario 2 – Catastrophic LNG Tank Rupture 
The second scenario involved a rupture of a single LNG storage tank. The tank consists of a 
typical inner tank within an external tank. The hypothetical mechanism was an unspecified 
heater malfunction that causes ice formation from the moisture in the air between the tanks, 
eventually causing the internal tank to shift and possibly fail, spilling LNG into the cavity. The 
cold LNG along the wall may ultimately cause the external tank wall to crack due to the high 
temperature differential with the outside environment, creating a triangular shaped hole for LNG 
to jet out of the tank. Since this was a worst case analysis, the hole size was a 1.27 m x 2.6 m 
triangular hole, which has a cross-sectional area of 1.65 m2. Note that this is roughly twice the 1 
m diameter hole size in PHMSA’s table that is considered an 8 x 10-5 per year event for a single 
containment atmospheric storage tank and a 1 x 10-5 per year event for a double containment 
atmospheric storage tank, and then a 5 x 10-6 and 5 x 10-7 per year event for respective 
catastrophic failures (14). The Bernoulli equation was used to determine the maximum flow out 
of the hole (15). For this hole size and a liquid level of 19.4 meters, the maximum flow came out 
to 33 m3/s or 13,500 kg/s. Different flow rates out of the tank can be achieved with different hole 
sizes or spill amounts from the internal tank, depending on the breach. The tank release was 
assumed to have a TI of 10% (high turbulence) and TLS of 0.0684 m. 
As mentioned in the literature, again, a rupture at the base of an LNG tank can cause jetting 
and flashing to occur (13). The flow was also highly turbulent, and due to mixing with the air 
and a swirling eddy generated off the side of the tank, the release from the tank rapidly 
aerosolized and a large portion flashed into a vapor in the simulation. A vertical slice plane of the 
release is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: LNG Tank Rupture through 1.65 m2 hole 
The results from these simulations were similar to the ones of the pipe guillotine, though 
much more concentrated and wider reaching. An example is shown in the following tank rupture 
simulation, that had the same wind from north-northwest at 2 m/s as the pipe guillotine 
simulation. 
 
Figure 11: NG vapors after catastrophic tank rupture, 2 m/s wind from north-northwest (blue = ½ LFL) 
Again, as can be seen from the topography images, the cryogenic NG vapors closely follow 
the terrain and the wind direction. Another observation is that while the ½ LFL contours for both 
scenarios reached the southeast corner of the domain, the LFL contours for the high pressure 
pipe guillotine scenario (Figure 9) extended further than those for the tank rupture scenario 
(Figure 11). Both simulations went for roughly 17 minutes. Even though the tank had a much 
larger release rate (by a factor of roughly 20), this decreased dispersion distance could be 
attributed to a slower volatilization rate, the physical location of the release being in the 
containment basin, or perhaps both factors. However, the cloud is also notably wider in several 
areas as well, likely due to more area overall where volatilization is occurring. 
Further Remarks on Model 
It needs to be emphasized that these are WCS models, and that not only would an ignition 
source be found well before the NG cloud travels several kilometers and mitigative systems 
would likely detect the leak and isolate it, but the actual models required by PHMSA for LNG 
facility siting should have a frequency threshold of 3 x 10-5 occurrences per year. Also, regarding 
pressurized leaks from pumps instead of vessels, if the maximum pump flow rate is known from 
pump curves then that should be used for a PHMSA LNG facility siting study, depending on the 
maximum number of pumps that could be in service (16). As such, neither of these models 
would apply for PHMSA facility siting and an actual consequence would be considerably 
smaller. Regarding selection of single accidental leakage sources (SALS) for calculating 
exclusion zones, it should be emphasized that because the terrain played a large role in these 
model outputs, other LNG facilities in locations with complex terrain may need to consider 
multiple wind directions to find the largest exclusion zone, and it is strongly encouraged to use a 
CFD model due to the channeling effect which leads to further dispersion distances than the 
empirical models.  
Another remark is that there is currently no way to check this model against the PHMSA 
validation protocol using the MEP database, since there are no cases with flashing jet releases. It 
would be beneficial for the LNG community if new experiments are carried out that focus on 
flashing jet releases so that such a model can be validated, and not just having data for spill pool 
models. Nevertheless, some basic qualitative comparisons can be made to see if the results are 
reasonable. The comparison to the PHAST LNG plume height versus length appears to be 
satisfactory based on the figures, as well as to pictures and videos of actual cryogenic gas plumes 
flowing across a surface. In addition, a basic test of a sealed container filled with a layer of 100% 
NG vapor at the bottom and another layer of 100% air at the top was simulated to see how well 
the model accounted for air and NG vapor mixing, particularly to make sure that the model 
treated the air and NG vapor as completely miscible and that the NG would end up slightly more 
concentrated at the top due to density differences. The test was run for 1 minute and revealed that 
this indeed was the case. 
 
Figure 12: Tank with air layer at top and NG layer at bottom at 0 seconds (left), then diffused after 62 seconds (right) 
Accident Prevention and Mitigation 
There are many factors to consider in design of the facility to prevent or mitigate accidental 
releases of LNG. For the sake of brevity, they are bulleted in the following list, and some will be 
further discussed in the conclusion. 
 Geometry of trenches that avoids long linear stretches without bends or angles; 
 Relocating site obstructions or additional containment that could potentially lead to 
channeling; 
 Geometry of dikes to better contain worst case jet releases from base of tanks 
through adequate height, slope, and proximity; 
 Reducing volumes of LNG by choosing smaller vessel sizes or using less inventory; 
 Creating more isolation points between LNG vessels and pumps by installing fail 
close (FC) valves that can trigger upon detection of a leak or trigger upon 
emergency shutdown (ESD) to reduce leak duration; 
 Safety instrumented systems (SIS) that monitor for gas, temperature, pressure, 
vacuum, and flow anomalies; 
 Using mechanical interlocks and other passive preventive measures on LNG pumps; 
 Reducing congestion of piping and equipment to decrease overpressures from flame 
acceleration or chain reaction events (17); 
 Using gas fueled turbines and compressors instead of boilers (18);  
 Eliminating hazards of road collisions with piping through checkpoints, covering 
exposed piping, rerouting roads, or putting in barriers capable of stopping a runaway 
truck; 
 Considering train derailment as a possible scenario and locating major LNG piping 
and equipment far enough away from train tracks to prevent significant releases; 
 Increasing numbers of gas detectors in the facility, particularly at high hazard areas 
or areas prone to leakage, and consider mapping detectors through dispersion 
modeling to improve response time and reduce leak duration;  
 Placing emphasis on automatic systems that detect the hazard and trigger an ESD 
and not relying solely on operator intervention or emergency response (ER); 
 Reducing tank rupture frequency by using a double containment LNG tank instead 
of a single containment LNG tank, or even further reducing the frequency by using a 
full containment LNG tank (19); 
 Monitoring integrity of large LNG tanks, internal heaters, ventilation systems; 
 Relief devices and systems for cryogenic equipment to prevent catastrophic failure 
of vessels and piping due to overpressure events; 
 Placement of vapor barriers around the site to redirect NG vapors or reduce their 
potential to impact the public; 
 Usage of gas lamps or other ignition sources around the site perimeter as a last line 
of defense to safeguard the public; 
 Usage of water spray curtains (20);  
 A robust process safety management (PSM) program that is regularly audited and 
continually improved; 
 A robust ERP that has considered all potential scenarios, trained ER personnel 
appropriately, and coordinates public communication effectively; 
 Risk based inspections (RBI); 
 Double walled piping to serve as secondary containment, especially for large 
diameter high pressure pipes, and shrouded piping; 
 Vacuum jacketed pipe (VJP) or vacuum insulated pipe (VIP); 
In general, the best way to stop problems from occurring is by putting into place robust 
prevention measures. How can we best prevent a release of LNG from occurring in the first 
place? It is important to have a robust mechanical integrity (MI) program. Is there the potential 
for water to contact the piping and act as a surfactant to transfer acids or bases that lead to 
corrosion of the pipe? Is there a possibility of impact by ground transportation? Safety systems 
should also be in good working order. Is there an automated dump or blowdown to manage 
excessive inventory and holdup in tanks? Running equipment at or near capacity can make it 
difficult to control a process if there is a unit upset or other incident. Do we always need a tank? 
Can the substance be left in the pipe? Is there the potential to flood the system or dump heat into 
it? Flare sizing is also very important. Is there a water seal at the bottom of the flare that could be 
blown off from rapid boiling? Cryogenic gases are highly compressed and expand very rapidly 
as they are heated. As such, flares at LNG facilities may need to be quite large, and the flashing 
of liquids into gases should be taken into account for the sizing calculations.  
If an accidental release does occur, mitigative options will also be important and should 
involve careful consideration from detailed consequence modeling. How closely are equipment 
placed in the plant? Equipment congestion can cause a loss of control at one piece of equipment 
to quickly involve another piece of equipment. Examples can include a spreading pool fire being 
fed by additional equipment or the increased flame acceleration from a congested vapor cloud 
explosion. The effects of channeling and the design of trenches, sumps, and vapor fences are 
very important should likewise be very closely evaluated to optimize dispersion of cryogenic 
vapors. 
Conclusion 
Through the help of complex analysis, especially CFD modeling, critical areas of an LNG 
facility that pose a considerable hazard and have large exclusion zones can be better identified 
and mitigated. Whether it be geometry of the trenches, containment dikes, contributions to 
channeling, or certain piping or process equipment too close to a road, hazards are more likely to 
be found to help direct mitigation efforts. Depending on the severity of a consequence, piping 
could be made safer by adding secondary containment and finding ways to reduce the release 
duration. LNG tanks can be made safer by choosing double or full containment tanks instead if 
the option is available, or by installing appropriate safeguards such as alarms for moisture 
content and temperature within the cavity of a double-walled tank. Also, mitigative barriers such 
as vapor fences and water curtains can reduce the dispersion distance of vaporized NG. Finally, 
while WCS may not be applicable to the PHMSA approval process, it can be of help for 
development of a robust ERP that considers all possible scenarios and knows how to respond in 
every situation. 
In addition, evaluation of SIS than can help prevent incidents from occurring or respond to 
them more quickly can be evaluated through a layer of protection analysis (LOPA) or other 
process hazards analysis (PHA) technique. Such credits for independent protective layers (IPLs) 
can then be applied to reduce the frequency of potential incidents to lower risk to an acceptable 
level. Any FC valves connected with the SIS can be placed in a manner that reduces release 
duration from LNG release events by isolating inventories and decreasing potential leakage 
sources downstream of a pump. Finally, gas detectors tied into the SIS can be placed throughout 
the site and mapped appropriately through placement by items of concern and those prone to 
leakage, as well as with dispersion modeling.  
Included with a focus on instrumentation should be a focus on mechanical aspects of the 
system. A robust MI program can likewise help in reducing the frequency of piping and 
equipment leakage. 
As a final remark, facilities with considerable topography variation need to consider the 
channeling effects from the terrain due to the considerable under prediction of dispersion 
distances without it. There are also holes in the MEP database used by PHMSA where jetting 
and flashing releases of LNG, especially at high pressures and flow rates, have not been 
accounted for. It would be desirable to have a way to validate these releases, since they appeared 
to be the most hazardous based on the discussions made by others, some of the models run, and 
also PHMSA’s own recognition of their importance from their request that these releases be 
included as SALS.   
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